THE “UNMEDIATED” AND “TECH-DRIVEN” CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF TODAY’S WINNING COMPANIES

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Recent corporate governance initiatives encourage a culture of long-term value creation and growth but cannot work as intended by policymakers. The current discussion about corporate governance ignores the transition from a centralized to a decentralized, unmediated, and interconnected world and the transition from a world of vertical hierarchies to a world of horizontal, open, and autonomous networks. This shift was initiated—and is increasingly accelerated—by rapid technological change, including developments in social media, blockchain-based smart contracts, decentralized autonomous organizations, big data, and artificial intelligence. This Article demonstrates how policymakers, regulators, business people, consultants, and other corporate governance experts can re-conceptualize corporate governance in a technology-driven and interconnected world.

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INTRODUCTION

Successful companies today share several common characteristics. They focus on building and maintaining their relevance in the digitized and networked marketplace. This requires such companies to design and re-design products or services that constantly deliver a personal, meaningful, relevant, and/or satisfying experience for consumers. More competitive companies embrace unmediated and technology-driven corporate governance practices in their efforts to create and maintain relevancy.

The use of data and algorithms will distinguish the successful companies of the future. Algorithmically-driven companies use new and emerging technologies to gather data from their consumers about their behavior and then instantaneously utilize this information to improve the consumer experience. A majority of the thirteen S&P 500 companies that showed an above average revenue growth over the last five years use data and algorithms extensively. These companies have become the main revenue and value generators, which usually leads to a higher market value per dollar of physical assets. The application of pattern recognition algorithms to large quantities of data also means that high market value can be created with relatively few employees. Indeed, algorithms replace middlemen, leading to flatter, unmediated organizations in which a best-idea-wins culture prevails.

Several disruptive startup companies, including Uber and Airbnb, have assumed the role of algorithmic middlemen. These companies have decentralized the transportation and


2. In a presentation at the DLD (Digital Life Design) 2017 Conference, Scott Galloway, Professor of Marketing at NYU/Stern School of Business, explained that the best way for a company to achieve and maintain relevancy (and become a winner of the future) is to become “algorithmically driven.” He mentions Facebook, Google, Amazon, Netflix, Uber, and Spotify as clear winners that have embraced such a model. See DLDconference, Winners & Losers (Scott Golloway, L2) — DLD17, YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2017), https://youtu.be/HmnZBurt1ZY?t=15.

3. Id.
hospitality industries respectively not by eliminating intermediaries but by replacing them.\(^4\) These companies facilitate “peer-to-peer” transactions between service providers/creators/producers on the one hand and consumers on the other hand. Their platforms and algorithms help to personalize the customer experience. The market value of Airbnb is currently higher than the value of the largest hotel chains in the world.\(^5\) Uber’s market valuation is almost equal to that of Volkswagen and higher than that of General Motors.\(^6\)

Successful companies of the future understand the importance of unmediated transactions and their role as facilitators for all stakeholders. The consumer experience is a central element of success for the companies of the future. Consumers are disinclined to deal with obscure, expensive, or even deceptive intermediaries. Rather, consumers expect to transact business directly with their counterparties, preferably on their own terms. But successful companies of the future do not focus exclusively on their customers and consumers in general. Rather, they build flat and inclusive relationships with all stakeholders, i.e., investors, directors, managers, and employees, but also early adopters, former employees, other companies, service providers, the different layers of government, and society at large.

Unmediated corporate governance structures and practices offer a better, faster, and more effective way for top-management to receive relevant input and feedback from the mar-


ket and subsequently identify potential responses and plan for the future. As a result, the overall dynamism and quality of decision-making gets substantially enhanced, equipping companies with the highest chance of success.

This Article evaluates unmediated and technology-driven corporate governance practices and processes that will best equip a company to become one of tomorrow’s winners. We demonstrate what policymakers, regulators, consultants and other experts can do to help companies organize now for a successful tomorrow.

I. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF DISRUPTED COMPANIES

Corporate history is littered with numerous examples of successful companies that drifted into obscurity after failing to embrace change. Nokia, Kodak, and Blackberry are prominent examples. All of these firms collapsed after fast changes in their respective markets rendered their products or services irrelevant.

Less successful companies often share a myopic and short-term focus on shareholder value maximization that has led to an unhealthy emphasis on firm share price, market valuations, and financial metrics that obscures issues of relevancy. Listed companies, in particular, are prone to put too much emphasis on financial metrics, such as return on net assets, return on capital deployed, and internal rate of return. Of course, it is


important to focus on financial metrics. However, it is also important to realize that an emphasis on measures that aim at quarterly earnings and short-term stock price performance can easily distract an organization from the important business task of identifying strategies that can help a firm remain relevant in the future.\(^9\)

Less successful companies are also often slow in embracing algorithmic technologies, data analytics, big data, and platforms.\(^10\) Instead, such companies usually prefer to concentrate on the execution of established business models built around existing and successful products or services.\(^11\) Executives with a knowledge of, and focus on, innovation and consumer experience—i.e., those responsible for the initial success of a company and best placed to deliver relevancy—often find them-

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9. See, e.g., EY, supra note 8, at 18; McKinsey Glob. Inst., supra note 8.
selves marginalized from core decision-making processes in companies that focus on established products.12

Figure 1: Microsoft’s “Financial” Performance

![Graph showing Microsoft's financial performance over time.](image)

A prominent example of a company that was successful under the old and established metrics, but that did not meet consumer demands, is Microsoft under Steve Ballmer. Microsoft was enormously profitable, even though it started to lose relevancy with consumers after Ballmer took over from

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founder Bill Gates as CEO in 2000. Figure 1 shows that Ballmer oversaw a tripling of sales from 2000 to 2015 and that he doubled profits and created a tremendous number of jobs. Ballmer acquired Skype and launched Xbox. By any of the traditional metrics, Steve Ballmer is considered a success.

However, Ballmer was not successful when considering the purpose of a company in terms of maintaining relevancy and offering meaningful consumer experiences. He failed to understand the most important technological developments taking place during his tenure as CEO. While a new world of networked technologies and mobile consumption arrived, Microsoft under Ballmer failed to adapt quickly enough, and as a result, Microsoft ceased to be relevant. Microsoft missed these developments because it focused on short-term financial metrics rather than on designing products relevant for the next generation of consumers. Instead, Ballmer let younger firms move in and reap the benefits.

After new CEO Satya Nadella took over, Microsoft changed direction, focusing on commercial cloud services (Azure), cognitive services (speech recognition artificial intelligence), and premium subscription and content services for

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17. Examples include search engines (Google), smart phones (Apple), mobile operating systems (Google and Apple), media (Netflix and Apple), and the Cloud (Amazon). In every case, Microsoft failed to recognize a new opportunity. Blank, supra note 15.
Windows 10. In short, the corporation was able to survive by re-inventing itself. From a relevancy perspective, this new strategic direction looks smart, even if Microsoft is unlikely to recapture its dominance of the 1980s or ‘90s.

II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM

Existing corporate governance metrics focus on maintaining the hierarchical and centralized structure within corporations. “Corporate governance” refers to the structures and procedures within an organization that aim at ensuring that authority, responsibility, and control flow “downwards” from investors—who are the economic, legal, and moral owners of the company—through a board of directors to management and, finally, to the employees. The existing corporate gover-

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Corporate governance is built on the idea of centralization around a well-defined hierarchy. Corporate governance rules are designed to protect those at the pinnacle of that hierarchy, particularly the minority investors. The dominant corporate governance view today focuses on maximization of shareholder value. According to the dominant view, the goal of a firm should be to increase the financial interests of the investors and by doing so the firm can maximize opportunities to become successful.


22. See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2000).

23. See Cornelius A. de Kleyn, A Primer on Corporate Governance 34–35 (William Q. Judge & Kenneth A. Merchant eds., 2d ed. 2013). Contra Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, EUROPEAN FINANCIAL REVIEW (Apr. 30, 2013), https://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/the-shareholder-value-myth/ (asserting that the consensus that corporations should be governed according to the shareholder primacy philosophy is crumbling, that “shareholder primacy is an abstract economic theory that lacks support from history, law, or the empirical evidence,” and that “the idea of a single shareholder value is intellectually incoherent”). For more on the shareholder/stakeholders debate, see, e.g., H. Jeff Smith, The Shareholders vs. Stakeholders Debate, MIT Sloan Mgmt. Rev. (July 15, 2003), http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-shareholders-vs-stakeholders-debate/. For the related debate on shareholder primacy versus director primacy, see, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate 1–2 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 02-04, Feb. 17, 2002), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=299727 (“[T]he literature assumes that the U.S. model towards which global systems are (or are not) converging is one of shareholder primacy. This is error. The term shareholder primacy typically connotes two distinct principles: (1) The shareholder wealth maximization norm, pursuant to which directors are obliged to make decision[s] based solely on the basis of long-term shareholder gain. This principle is well-established in U.S. corporate law and, for purposes of this essay, may be taken as given. (2) The principle of ultimate shareholder control. Although shareholders do not wield day-to-day authority, they purportedly exercise ultimate decisionmaking authority through proxy contests, institutional investor activism, shareholder litigation, and the market for corporate control. Here is where the error lies. Insofar as control is concerned, U.S. corporate law is far more accurately described as a system of director primacy than one..."
In practice, this shareholder primacy model means adopting measures that aim to ensure that all of the other actors and stakeholders within a firm act as if they were investor-shareholders.24 By aligning the interests and incentives of the various actors in this way, firm performance—as measured by the share price—is improved. This benefits all of the stakeholders in a firm, as well as the public who benefit from the goods and services that a successful firm provides.25

Minimizing the risk of corporate scandals is a core objective of corporate governance reforms. Good corporate governance, under this view, i.e., maximizing shareholder value, should first aim to reduce the risk of managerial misbehavior.26 Identifying structures, practices, processes, and mechanisms for achieving this goal has provided the impetus for

of shareholder primacy.”) (footnotes omitted); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. Rev. 547, 591 (2003) (“[T]he theory of director primacy is superior to the prevailing shareholder primacy model both as a positive account of the existing law and as a normative theory of corporate governance.”); Lucian Arye. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 855–36 (2005) (noting that “empirical evidence indicate[s] that shareholders’ existing power to replace directors is insufficient to secure the adoption of value-increasing governance arrangements that management disfavors” and that shareholders lack the power “to initiate and vote to adopt changes in the company’s basic corporate governance arrangements”); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 Va. L. Rev. 675, 732 (2005) (concluding, as the title suggests, “[t]he shareholder franchise is largely a myth”). For a recent discussion of the law relating to shareholder primacy, see Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017).


25. For a discussion of the arguments for and against the economic benefits of the maximization of shareholder value theory, see William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance, 29 Econ. & Soc’y 13 (2000).

26. See generally Christophe Volonté, Foundations of Corporate Governance 6 (Feb. 2, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1991135 (stating that the aim of corporate governance is “to protect investors against managerial misbehavior”). See also David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 223, 231 (1991) (“For shareholders to maximize returns on their investments under these circumstances [separation of ownership and control], the costs of managerial shirking and other forms of misbehavior must be minimized.”).
most of the regulatory reform in this field over the last decade. Starting with the Enron accounting fraud, corporate scandals have had a significance—that was not previously the case. Politicians are under much greater pressure to act against corporations, and the result has been that much of the post-2000 regulatory debate has been driven by the need to mitigate the risk of corporate misbehavior. Misbehavior here simply means acting in a way that is detrimental to the shareholder-owners’ best interests. According to this view, a corporate culture that eradicates—or at least minimizes—opportunities for misbehavior of any kind offers the best means of maximizing shareholder value and is, therefore, optimal.

Corporate governance reforms that focus on minimizing the risk of corporate scandals increase shareholder value. Shareholder value maximization is seen as a by-product of aligning the interests of executives-management with the interests of shareholders. Corporate governance reforms that focus on minimizing the risk of corporate scandals view executives, managers, and other employees as motivated by self-interest and operating with an unhealthy disregard for the negative consequences of their actions on investors (and society). If management acts opportunistically at the expense of shareholder value, everyone suffers the negative consequences of

27. See Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate Governance, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 38 (2015) (“The governance scandals of the early 2000s and the resulting outcry prompted swift and substantial changes to the federal regulation of board composition and structure as part of what was for U.S. corporate governance ‘something like a hundred year flood of reform.’”); Bruce E. Aronson, Corporate Governance Models and Practices in Japan and East Asia: Proceedings of a Panel Discussion, 27 Colum. J. Asian L. 221, 237 (2014) (“In the United States, which is known as a shareholder system, the main focus of corporate governance reform over the past few decades has been to strengthen the monitoring function of the boards of directors to aid shareholders in addressing the problem of agency costs.”).


firm underperformance and possible bankruptcy. Hence, increasing shareholder control over other actors within the firm has become the primary goal of corporate governance rules. And, if the corporate governance is “right,” shareholder value will naturally follow. Indeed, Jack Welch—longtime CEO of General Electric and widely viewed as a shareholder value maximization evangelist—insisted after the financial crisis of 2008 that maximizing shareholder value should be viewed as “an outcome rather than a strategy.” Despite all efforts at corporate governance reform, the perception of corporations’ damaging short-term focus remains a problem. Increasing the accountability of corporate executives to shareholders and increasing shareholder control over executives does not address the problem of short-term focus. In fact, it may actually have the counterproductive and unintended effect of further incentivizing a damaging emphasis on quarterly financial reporting.

In an attempt to remedy the problems associated with short-termism, several recent policy initiatives and proposals aim at creating a corporate governance culture with a focus on

long-term value creation. Some recent policy developments aim at encouraging shareholders to take a more responsible long-term perspective when investing in a company. Other recent initiatives focus on the role of the board of directors or management board in developing and implementing strategies and cultures that produce long-term value.

In an attempt to create more responsible shareholders, multiple jurisdictions have adopted so-called stewardship corporate governance codes that focus on long-term value creation.

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Shareholders, particularly institutional investors, are viewed as stewards of the company. Stewards necessarily take a long-term view of the firm and embrace a more active role in the supervision of management issues.\textsuperscript{39} The drafters of the stewardship codes adopted the view that mandating shareholders, particularly institutional investors, to embrace a longer-term view when making their investments leads to a more balanced corporate culture.\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{39} Taiwan’s code provides, “The Principles, through provision of a principle-based framework and guidance, are intended to encourage institutional investors to apply their expertise and influence, and fulfill their duties as asset owners or managers, so as to enhance long-term value for themselves and capital providers. The institutional investors, through monitoring, engaging in dialogue and interacting with investee companies, as well as efforts to enhance investment value, are also able to improve the quality of corporate governance of the investee companies, thus creating an overall positive effect on the development of industry, economy and society.” \textit{Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Center}, supra note 38, at 2. Principle 3 is to “regularly monitor investee companies.” \textit{Id.} at 5. The other codes have similar provisions. For example, the Japanese code provides in Principle 3, “Institutional investors should monitor investee companies so that they can appropriately fulfill their stewardship responsibilities with an orientation towards the sustainable growth of the companies.” \textit{The Council of Experts Concerning the Japanese Version of the Stewardship Code}, supra note 38, at 6. Principle 3 of the UK’s code provides, “Institutional investors should monitor their investee companies.” \textit{Financial Reporting Council}, supra note 38, at 7. These codes also provide guidance for implementing the principle.


that while “most everyone agrees that we need good corporate governance, there has been wide disagreement on what that actually means.” In July 2016, a group of leading corporate executives, asset managers, and investors unveiled a report that examined the “commonsense principles” for publicly listed companies, their boards of directors, and shareholders. Although the Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance focuses particularly on publicly listed companies in the United States, it also aims to help policymakers in other jurisdictions assess and recalibrate corporate governance mechanisms.

The Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance reflects the drafters’ intention to encourage executives to take a long-term approach to the governance of their companies. A long-term approach under such principles can be accomplished by framing the required quarterly reporting in the broader context of the company’s articulated strategy and by providing a company outlook for trends and metrics that reflect progress,
or lack thereof, on long-term goals. However, it is the sort of approach one might take if one owned 100% of a company.

The focus on long-term value creation has become increasingly widespread. On September 2, 2016, the International Council of the World Economic Forum issued *The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth* (“The New Paradigm”). Like the *Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance*, *The New Paradigm* gives the board of directors a crucial role in implementing corporate strategies and a corporate culture that pursues sustainable long-term value creation. Similarly, in January 2017, a coalition of institutional investors and global asset managers issued the *Corporate Governance Principles for US Listed Companies* by the Investor Stewardship Group. These principles also fo-

46. Lipton, *The New Paradigm*, supra note 40; see also Martin Lipton et al., *Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz Memorandum on a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance* (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK25487.17.pdf (“*The Compact for Responsive and Responsible Leadership: A Roadmap for Sustainable Long-Term Growth and Opportunity and The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth* received significant attention at the 2017 Davos annual meeting of the International Business Council (IBC) of the World Economic Forum (WEF). The New Paradigm, which sets forth a set of principles recalibrating the relationship between corporations and investors to help them resist short-termism and facilitate long-term value creation, was prepared by the undersigned and approved at the August 2016 meeting of the IBC. The Compact, a one-page document that is in large measure based on The New Paradigm and allows companies and investors to endorse the key tenets of The New Paradigm by signing onto The Compact, has already been endorsed by more than 100 companies worldwide. To facilitate implementation of The Compact, the IBC published a short summary of the key provisions of The New Paradigm representing best practices for implementation of The Compact. The IBC is continuing to seek endorsement of The Compact. We believe that The Compact and The New Paradigm will reduce short-termism and promote long-term sustainable investment. We recommend endorsement of, and adherence to, The New Paradigm and The Compact by all companies, institutional investors and asset managers.”).
47. Lipton, *The New Paradigm*, supra note 40.
CUS ON LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION.⁴⁹ THEY ARE BASED ON THE BELIEF THAT SHAREHOLDERS AND INVESTORS ARE BEST SUITED TO APPOINT DIRECTORS WHO REPRESENT THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY.⁵⁰ THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS SHOULD MONITOR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOP INCENTIVE STRUCTURES THAT ARE ALIGNED WITH THESE INTERESTS.

III. LIMITS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM

Increasing firm relevance through corporate governance reform encounters many limitations. In fact, corporate governance reforms via new, revised, or additional corporate governance rules, guidelines, principles, or codes are often met with a mixture of indifference, skepticism, and even hostility from management and governance experts working for listed companies.⁵¹ In practice, top-down corporate governance reform measures rarely, if ever, result in a genuine change in the governance and culture of firms.⁵²

Compliance fatigue among corporate executives is a very common phenomenon that can be explained by several factors. Corporate governance is a persistent and regular occurrence that could require corporate executives’ and compliance departments’ almost constant attention and responsiveness to a regular onslaught of corporate governance reform attempts via new, revised, or additional corporate governance rules, guidelines, principles or codes.

⁴⁹. Id.
⁵⁰. Id.
Corporate governance reform often takes place by repackaging old content with new or revised labels. For instance, the announcement of the *Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance* stated with much fanfare that wide disagreement exists regarding the parameters of high-quality or good corporate governance. Yet, the *Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance* added very little that could be considered new governance and mostly regurgitated existing principles with some new labels.

Corporate governance initiatives that encourage long-term thinking rarely work as expected by policymakers. While many obvious benefits derive from the adoption of stewardship codes, there are also risks associated with such adoptions. More specifically, it is unclear if requiring shareholders to be more responsible can be a realistic and sensible objective. In fact, mobilizing investors may actually lead managers to ask the wrong kind of questions about what needs to be done to ensure sustainable success. Rather than incentivizing a focus on innovation and relevancy, such measures merely reinforce the centralized shareholder primacy view. Indeed, stewardship pressures often expose companies to an unhealthy focus on short-term dividends and share buybacks designed to please the stock market.

53. ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 42.


55. Here are some examples of provisions relating to shareholder responsibility. “Institutional investors should seek to arrive at an understanding in common with investee companies and work to solve problems through constructive engagement with investee companies.” PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 38, Principle 4; “Maintain an appropriate dialogue and interaction with investee companies.” STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 38, Principle 4; “Institutional investors should . . . establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate their stewardship activities.” FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 38, Principle 4.
Figure 2: Thirteen S&P 500 Winners – Average Revenue Growth and History of Dividends and Other Distributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Average Revenue Growth (2012 - 2016)</th>
<th>History of Dividends and other Distributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welltower</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexion Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesforce</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Armour</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazon</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripadvisor</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priceline</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognizant Technology</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Google/Alphabet</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Tower</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Het</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equinix</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 illustrates that a focus on dividends and share buybacks makes it extremely difficult for a company to invest in innovations that are critical to maintaining relevancy over the long-term. Underscoring this point, Figure 2 shows that ten out of the thirteen S&P 500 with an above-average revenue growth have never paid any dividends to their shareholders and were never engaged in share buyback activities.

The debate on the primary responsibility for a long-term value creation strategy within firms has identified several core players. Competing interests and their proponents have suggested that responsibility for long-term value creation strategy rests with either the board, shareholders, customers, employees, or even creditors. The Dutch Corporate Governance Code, issued in December 2016, suggests that the board should be tasked with developing a view on the firm’s long-term value creation and should formulate a strategy for it.\textsuperscript{56} Implementation of such code guidance is rather difficult in practice as def-

\textsuperscript{56} Monitoring Commissie, De Nederlandse Corporate Governance Code (Dec. 2016), http://www.mccg.nl/download/?id=3364. Depending on market dynamics, it may be necessary to make short-term adjustments to the strategy. Id. at 13.
Initiations of long-term value, and the beneficiary of the value creation, are unclear.

Serial entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, futurists, and business visionaries argue that a customer-first approach is the key to creating a corporate environment that ensures relevancy for the long term.57 Relevancy-for-consumers will then be reflected in continued commercial success and value creation.58

Others take an employee-first approach.59 They are appalled by the current corporate environment in which mass layoffs are implemented to increase or maintain the current level of the stock price.60 Proponents of an employee-first approach also take issue with rewarding executives for the business decisions that (presumably) created the problems on the balance sheet and triggered the pressure to reduce labor costs.


60. See, e.g., Colin Campbell, Why Nintendo’s Satoru Iwata Refuses to Lay Off Staff, POLYGON (July 5, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.polyon.com/2015/7/5/4496512/why-nintendos-satoru-iwata-refuses-to-lay-off-staff; How Layoffs Hurt Companies, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Apr. 12, 2016), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/how-layoffs-cost-companies/.
These commentators argue that management should build a corporate culture that will motivate employees and maximize opportunities for employee job satisfaction. In their view, maintaining employee happiness is the key to customer happiness and, by extension, the long-term commercial success of a firm.

IV. UNMEDIATED & TECHNOLOGY-BASED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The debate over responsibility for long-term value creation strategy within firms largely ignores new realities and corresponding data trends. Society is transitioning from a centralized infrastructure to a decentralized, unmediated, and interconnected infrastructure, and from a world of vertical hierarchies to a world of horizontal, open, and autonomous networks. Therefore, we suggest moving beyond the short-
term versus long-term framing of the issue. Instead, this Article introduces an alternative framework for thinking about how firms need to be governed and organized in order to maximize opportunities for establishing and sustaining relevancy.

Rapid technological change initiated and accelerated society’s transition from a centralized infrastructure to a decentralized, unmediated, and interconnected infrastructure (see Figure 3). The Internet has enabled a free, fast, and global exchange of information and ideas.65 In addition, online shopping has brought firms and consumers closer together, both in time and space.66 Social media has further revolutionized the way we exchange and share information. The social impact of these changes has been astonishing. Within one generation, every aspect of social interaction has been transformed.67 Maintaining a strong social media presence is now essential for

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all firms. The goal of such connectivity is to build a crowd culture around a product or brand. Such a culture adds to the user experience and ensures brand loyalty.

**Figure 3: Technological Change and the Interconnected World**

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In society's increasingly interconnected infrastructure, platform companies are disrupting established markets and challenging incumbents, including major corporations. Their business model hinges on peer-to-peer transactions on or through community-based platforms. Most importantly, platform companies embrace an unmediated, flat, and inclusive culture. Trust and value are created through platforms.


72. See Erik P.M. Vermeulen, 5 Ways Businesses Can Thrive in an Age of Disruptive Technology, a Millennial Culture and a Sharing Economy, VUNELA
instead of the management of workers and physical assets.\textsuperscript{73} Figure 4 illustrates that platform companies with few assets and even fewer employees are driving the rapid growth in the new economy.

Decentralization of society’s increasingly interconnected infrastructure will exponentially increase through technology. The most successful companies make extensive use of algorithms and data analytics to decentralize the relationship between businesses and their consumers. In particular, blockchain-based smart contracts in digital marketplaces are predisposed to extend and lead these decentralization changes.\textsuperscript{74} The expansion of the sharing economy, the Internet of Things (IoT) and artificial intelligence further accelerate these developments.\textsuperscript{75}


\textsuperscript{75} See, e.g., Arun Sundararajan, \textit{The Rise of the Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism} (2016); Ben Dickson, \textit{Decentralizing IoT Networks Through Blockchain}, TECHCRUNCH
FIGURE 4: AIRBNB VERSUS MARRIOTT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIRBNB</th>
<th>MARRIOTT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>9 years</td>
<td>90 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rooms/Listings</strong></td>
<td>1.1 million in 110 countries</td>
<td>2 million in more than 191 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employees</strong></td>
<td>127,500</td>
<td>4,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Valuation</strong></td>
<td>$17.8bn</td>
<td>$30bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value per Employee</strong></td>
<td>$0.1m</td>
<td>$7m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


applications are in most instances investor relations websites that are either static or not very interactive. If regular updates are provided, the websites are often slow and only give the viewer formalistic and legalized information. Information presented on these webpages is usually highly standardized.

The disruption of corporate governance by networks and platforms is still at a nascent stage. While technology applications in corporate governance would add tremendous value, surprisingly few workable applications exist in this area. Electronic proxies and electronic voting at annual meetings of shareholders are increasingly used by incumbents and insurgents alike. Boards appreciate the relevance and role of IT services, internet portals, and board meeting management software in making them more efficient in performing their duties.

Despite the obvious benefits of technology applications in corporate governance, the technological revolution has not yet precipitated a wide acceptance of more unmediated and decentralized corporate governance structures and practices. For instance, social media, which facilitates the real-time exchange of information, has yet to take a foothold in discussions about corporate governance. "Indeed, an analysis of the 250 leading companies that appear on the Forbes Global 2000 list shows that only seven percent have a CEO who is personally active and connected on Twitter."


79. The list includes the leading publicly listed companies in the world based on sales, profit, assets, and market value. See Andrea Murphy, 2016 Forbes Global 2000: How We Crunch the Numbers, Forbes (May 25, 2016, 6:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andreamurphy/2016/05/25/how-we-crunch-the-numbers/.

Companies should care deeply about unmediated and technology-based corporate governance solutions. Traditional forms of coordination, with a focus on hierarchy, command, and control, are suboptimal for generating the innovation that allows firms to survive.81 Inclusive and unmediated relationships among firms’ stakeholders are increasingly necessary to enable firms to innovate and stay relevant.82 Compared to the more control-oriented, centralized, and vertical organizational forms, inclusive and unmediated relationships among firms’ stakeholders require a high degree of cooperation, loyalty, and mutual trust. Various studies suggest that a less hierarchical and more collaborative relationship between corporate boards, management, investors, and other stakeholders can promote economic growth and accelerate innovation.83 This position was adopted in most of the recent corporate govern-


ance reform proposals, acknowledging that collaboration among stakeholders is necessary to ensure that companies and their products or services remain relevant.

As the relationship between stakeholders inside and outside a company becomes unmediated and looser, a different form of coordination becomes necessary. Correspondingly, corporate governance structures will need to be reevaluated. The corporate governance framework is still framed in terms of hierarchy, even after recent reforms. Future corporate governance infrastructures can help build and manage more inclusive, unmediated, and open organizations with an enhanced role for technology.

A. Unmediated Corporate Communication

Social media creates a greater degree of openness in corporate communications. It represents a break from traditional forms of corporate communications in organizations that have historically been closed systems characterized by a lack of transparency and information flow. Still, only a small number of corporate CEOs, directors, or other executives are using social media today. This is a missed opportunity because the CEOs who embrace new forms of communication have, in almost all cases, helped the performance of their respective company or otherwise improved the company.

84. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance After The Financial Crisis (2012). Bainbridge describes and critically analyzes the proposals noting that some “lack strong empirical or theoretical justification.” Id. at 15. He also notes that “[t]he federal shareholder empowerment mandates of recent years . . . chip away at the very foundations of corporate governance.” Id. at 206.

85. The social media activity we refer to has less to do with corporate marketing and branding and more with the decentralization and democratization of the firm by sharing and vocalizing the ins-and-outs of its inner workings.


The sense of mistrust that can emerge between investors, managers, employees, and consumers necessitates an increased emphasis in corporate communications on building and maintaining a healthy bond among stakeholders. A greater degree of openness and transparency in these communications can help create respect and trust. Particularly important in this context is the unmediated and open dialogue among the various stakeholders.

Open dialogue involves a different style of information dissemination and exchange. Open dialogue in corporate communications is not merely about sharing information, but rather refers to building an on-going, unmediated, and constructive dialogue with other actors in the firm and the market that can then have a significant impact on the future relevance and performance of the company.

An unmediated dialogue is characterized by a more personalized and unpolished approach to corporate communication than a mediated dialogue. Unmediated corporate communication requires acknowledging the potential benefits that accrue from a freer flow of information within an organization and between the organization and those on the outside. The use of legalese or any substantial involvement of the legal department in corporate communications can have a significantly detrimental effect on the originality and authenticity of corporate communications, making them mediated and less effective.

Effective and trust-building transparent corporate communications, including via social media, share several core elements. Such corporate communications may: (1) aim for transparency and relevancy; (2) personalize, humanize, and communicate a distinctive story; (3) communicate an un-
mediated and unpolished vision; (4) address the “hard” issues, are vulnerable, and exhibit care; (5) demonstrate leadership; (6) generate “buzz”; (7) use best practices and constantly review such practices; (8) build relationships and invite input; and (8) communicate in a “speech-like” manner.

Unmediated corporate communications help create and maintain a culture of honesty and openness. Honesty is often not valued in a centralized, hierarchical environment. In the heavily mediated and redacted corporate world, the focus is on “good news only.” Nobody wants to be the messenger delivering bad news. This attitude often results in the late detection of issues and implications. Consider Nokia’s failure to effectively compete in the smart-phone market (see Figure 5). Middle management was discouraged from disclosing the shortcomings of Nokia’s smart phone operating system. Volkswagen’s emissions issues and Samsung’s exploding batteries scandal is among many other examples.


Unmediated corporate communications create real-time feedback for corporate executives. Social media platforms enable instant feedback from the crowd, often in the form of comments, likes, and shares. Corporate executives can judge the effectiveness of their corporate communications via the social media feedback or buzz they receive. The wisdom of the crowd helps companies carefully craft their brand and identity. A more quantifiable and data-driven approach to corporate communications helps companies make smarter decisions and enhances their know-how. Problems can be addressed more effectively based on data. Moreover, such communications enable companies to develop a more extensive and deeper network. The companies will retain more performance-related information necessary for planning and will offer a more collaborative and meaningful environment for all stakeholders.

Unmediated corporate communications could facilitate vision and leadership. Today’s successful companies usually have visionary and founder-type leaders. These leaders are often known for their charismatic keynote presentations that contribute largely to stakeholders’ expectations and views about the future relevance of the company. Visionary leaders also deliver clear, concise, and appropriate narratives/stories via unmediated communication channels, such as social me-
Their companies may be more likely to remain relevant in the near and distant future. Leaders with subpar presentation skills can excel in the world of social media. Social media makes it possible for every leader—irrespective of personal charisma—to become a visionary.

In the future, engaging in a more unmediated dialogue will be one of the key responsibilities of a good corporate leader. Corporate lawyers and corporate governance experts currently still seem to discourage a more personalized and speech-like way of communicating for corporate executives. Particularly, they are reluctant to promote the use of social media by corporate executives and directors in fear of the misunderstandings that it may cause in the market and the possible subsequent liabilities. We are not aware of CEOs or other high-placed executives actively using social media to engage with stakeholders even though the use of social media, for instance, can be extremely powerful for corporate leaders. It forces them to think, articulate, and question. The content of the message can go a long way in bridging the knowledge gap between the company and its stakeholders, giving the company a “heart and soul,” and ultimately aligning incentives between the company and its stakeholders.

Social media and other nontraditional forms of corporate communication are becoming an integral part of a company’s governance and even its products or services. Corporate communication, corporate organization-governance, and corporate products and services are becoming inextricably linked with one another. It is thus not surprising that today’s successful companies use a combination of traditional and new opportunities and possibilities for more imaginative forms of information dissemination.93 Social media and other online me-

dia, such as blogs and YouTube videos, are becoming more and more important as a forum for disclosing information about a company.94

In addition to social media, an increasing number of company leaders now communicate with investors via an annual letter.95 In many cases such letters have become more important to investors as a source of information than the official annual reports and other more conventional or traditional modes of financial communication.96 Some


94. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Says Social Media OK for Company Announcements If Investors Are Alerted (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171513574. For an example of such an alert, see Social Media Disclosure, NETFLIX, https://www.netflixinvestor.com/resources/social-media-disclosure/default.aspx (last visited May 30, 2017), which states: “Investors and others should note that we announce material financial information to our investors using this investors website, SEC filings, press releases, public conference calls[,] and webcasts. We also use social media to communicate with our subscribers and the public about our company, our services [,] and other issues. It is possible that the information we post on social media could be deemed to be material information. Therefore, we encourage investors, the media, and others interested in our company to review the information we post on the U.S. social media channels listed below. This list may be updated from time to time.” The list specifies: The Netflix Investor Relations YouTube Page; The Netflix Blog; The Netflix Tech Blog; The Netflix Facebook Page; The Netflix Twitter Feed; Reed Hastings’ Public Facebook Page; and Reed Hastings’ Twitter Feed. See also Nora Ganim Barnes & Jessica Griswold, 2016 Fortune 500, UMASS DARTMOUTH (2017), https://www.umassd.edu/cmr/research/social-media-research/2016-fortune-500/; Richard Levick, The Impact of the SEC’s Social Media Pronouncement, FORBES (May 15, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2013/05/15/the-impact-of-the-secs-social-media-pronouncement/.


evidence exists that such letters work best when written in a highly personalized, honest, and unpolished style.97 Companies have also expanded this approach, using alternative forms of media to engage investors. Well-documented examples of companies that have adopted these methods include Berkshire Hathaway,98 Netflix,99 Facebook,100 Sales-

97. See, e.g., Berman & Knight, supra note 96; Selena Maranjian, How to Pick the Best Stocks: CEO Candor Predicts Performance, AOL (Jan. 16, 2013, 12:10 PM), https://www.aol.com/article/2013/01/16/pick-best-stocks-honest-ceo-candor/20425566/; Schonberger, supra note 96; Vozzo, supra note 96.

98. See Buffett, supra note 95.

99. In 2009, Netflix founder Reed Hastings pointed out that too many corporations have “nice sounding” value statements, such as integrity, communication, respect, and excellence. Reed Hastings, Netflix Culture: Freedom and Responsibility 4, NETFLIX (Aug. 1, 2009), https://www.slideshare.net/reed2001/culture-1798664. In a 124-page slide deck, Hastings outlined how the dynamics of this employer-employee relationship need to be changed. The slide deck stipulates: “The actual company values, as opposed to the nice-sounding values, are shown by who gets rewarded, promoted, or let go.” Id. at 6. This forward-thinking approach to culture helps to attract talented people, as it offers them a much greater degree of freedom and responsibility. Indeed, the opportunities afforded by such freedom and responsibility make companies attractive. In the absence of this type of culture, the best young talent will simply leave. Inside Netflix it is all about context, not control. The result is that every Netflix employee is basically treated as an entrepreneur.

force, and Tesla.

Warren Buffett’s annual letters to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders epitomize corporate communication that became an integral part of the firm’s governance and product. The letters are considered a must read for anyone with an interest in the corporate world as they not only provide investors and other stakeholders with last year’s financial information and future developments and growth prospects, but also include personalized business advice and insights. Addition-


103. For example, on active fund managers Buffett has written, “If 1,000 managers make a market prediction at the beginning of the year, it’s very likely that the calls of at least one will be correct for nine consecutive years. Of course, 1,000 monkeys would be just as likely to produce a seemingly all-wise prophet. But there would be a difference: the lucky monkey would not find people standing in line to invest with him.” Stephen Grocer, Quips and Quotes from Warren Buffett’s 2016 Shareholder Letter, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 25, 2017, 12:54 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2017/02/25/quotes-and-quotes-from-warren-buffetts-2016-shareholder-letter/ (quoting the Berkshire Hathaway 2016 investor letter). Similarly, on investing during severe market downturns he has written, “During such scary periods, you should never forget two things: First, widespread fear is your friend as an investor, because it serves up bargain purchases. Second, personal fear is your enemy. It will also be unwarranted. Investors who avoid high and unnecessary costs and simply sit for an extended period with a collection of large, conservatively-financed American businesses will almost certainly do well.” Id. See also Luke Kawa, Lessons from the Oracle: Warren Buffett’s Shareholder Letter, Annotated, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 25, 2017, 8:06 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-02-25/lessons-from-the-oracle-warren-buffetts-shareholder-letter-annotated; Stephen Grocer, Quips and Quotes from Warren Buffett’s 2015
ally, the Berkshire letters attract enormous attention on social media\textsuperscript{104} and often create significant hype, which makes the communication even more personalized, open, and effective.

B. Unmediated Board of Directors

A long and drawn out academic debate tries to define the role of the board of directors. Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, most commentators saw a predominantly independent board as a necessary and dynamic wedge between the company and its insiders on the one hand, and the capital market and investors on the other.\textsuperscript{105} The dominant view treats the board as supervisor/monitor of the senior managers.\textsuperscript{106} As a consequence, the board of directors tends to focus on the con-

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trol of managerial misbehavior and the monitoring of company past-performance and sustainability. An alternative way of framing the issue moves beyond the control frame and emphasizes the crucial role of the board in advising and contributing to the strategic direction and future performance of a company.\textsuperscript{107}

In practice, successful companies already move beyond the parameters of the academic debate. Successful companies recognize that the monitoring and advising role of the board is no longer sufficient and that the board of directors in many ways may constitute a missed opportunity for receiving feedback on company initiatives, e.g., unmediated and relevant input from the market.\textsuperscript{108} Successful companies have included a diverse range of individuals who are expected to assist management by providing unmediated and relevant input from the market. Such market feedback is highly necessary to identify a plan to remain relevant in the future. We call such directors “feedback providers.”\textsuperscript{109} Feedback effects are essential for fu-


\textsuperscript{109.} Almost half of the board of directors (45%) in the thirteen S&P 500 companies that showed an above average revenue growth over the last five years are “feedback providers” who make board decisions more data-driven. For the identity of the thirteen companies, see Matt Krantz, 13 Big Companies
 Directors as feedback providers bring a variety of different useful backgrounds to the role. Some are technologists or technical visionaries. Often such individual directors and entrepreneurs have been responsible for overseeing technology matters of crucial importance in similar markets or on the periphery of a company’s core business. Others may hold academic positions, particularly in the area of biotech, medicine, and engineering. These backgrounds of directors as feed-

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112. Examples include Daniell P. Huttenlocher, Dean and Vice Provost, Cornell Tech, Cornell University, at Amazon; Shirley Ann Jackson, President of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute at FedEx; John Hennessy, President of Stanford University, at Google. For the role of academics on healthcare boards, see Timothy S. Anderson et al., Prevalence and Compensation of Academic Leaders, Professors, and Trustees on Publicly Traded US Healthcare Company Boards of Directors: Cross Sectional Study, BMJ (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.bmj
back providers are consistent with their invaluable role for firms in identifying issues and opportunities pertaining to disruptive innovation.

Digital technology experts as feedback directors on boards add additional value in the ever-expanding digital age. An important example of a board that includes digital technology feedback providers is The Walt Disney Company. The appointment of Sheryl Sandberg (of Facebook) and Jack Dorsey (of Twitter and Square) to the Disney board was essential in bringing the requisite social media and technology expertise to the company.113 The inclusion of diverse perspectives/data and digital feedback providers helps Disney to address contemporary business challenges and stay relevant. This approach may also enable a more collaborative relationship with management and ensure that new technology perspectives are incorporated into the decision-making processes in a way that adds genuine value.

Additionally, artificial intelligence may soon become an integral part of board decision-making. It is conceivable that future boards will include a seat for an artificial intelligent board member with voting authority.114


future, it seems feasible that artificial intelligence will have an independent board seat and may be trusted to make smarter data-driven choices than humans.115


115. We would like the reader to imagine the following example at a board meeting at a gaming company in the near future. The company faces a “make or break” decision that could determine the fate of the firm: Do we want to go into “augmented reality” games? Once a commitment is made, there will be no going back. This choice is existential; it will affect everything. Get it wrong and the firm may very well die. And the deadline for deciding has already passed. The board is split down the middle: four votes in favor and four votes against. An enormous amount of information has been gathered and perused, but endless meetings and heated discussion have failed to break the deadlock. Finally, the CEO proposes a solution. “Why not let AIMEE decide?” AIMEE is the ninth member of the board, an artificial intelligent machine, a supercomputer making decisions using state-of-the-art algorithms. The board considers the CEO’s proposal. AIMEE had been trusted with decisions before, but they usually involved the processing of vast amounts of data gathered from the crowd. This time was different. This time it was a strategic choice that required a delicate balancing of multiple factors. Confident that AIMEE would make the only correct decision, the board unanimously agreed. AIMEE would deliver the casting vote. See Michael Schrage, 4 Models for Using AI to Make Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 27, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/4-models-for-using-ai-to-make-decisions. But see Sam Ransbotham, Can Artificial Intelligence Replace Executive Decision Making MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (June 28, 2016), http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/can-artificial-intelligence-replace-executive-decision-making/. See generally George Dvorsky, How Much Longer Before Companies Start to Run Themselves, GIZMODO (Feb. 20, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://io9.gizmodo.com/how-much-longer-before-companies-start-to-run-themselves-1687015200; Graham Kendall, Computers Are Knocking on the Door of the Company Boardroom, CONVERSATION (Apr. 28, 2015, 6:54 AM EDT), http://theconversation.com/computers-are-knocking-on-the-door-of-the-company-boardroom-39512.
V. DECENTRALIZED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Corporate governance in the networked age is subject to tremendous change that transcends the traditional corporate governance discussions. Traditional corporate governance discussions pertaining to controlling managers,116 promoting long-termism,117 and independent boards118 are replaced by

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considerations more suitable for the digital and networked age. Such considerations include: the role of social media, flatter and open organizations, and, in the not too distant future, artificial intelligence. Critics who argue that it is pointless to concern oneself with future science-fiction-type prospects are wrong. The use of artificial intelligence on boards is


a real prospect, and multiple new technologies, including blockchain-based smart contracts, are predestined to disrupt corporate governance but may at the same time provide solutions.

The governance structure of a digital Decentralized Autonomous Organization (“DAO”) founded in May 2016 provides some guidance about possible future corporate governance solutions. The DAO founders originally intended to create a corporate-type organization without using a conventional centralized structure. The DAO was completely decentralized and did not have a physical address, as it consisted completely of computer code and an array of smart contracts. Indeed, the DAO had no directors, managers, or employees. The governance structure was built with software, code, and smart contracts that ran on a public decentralized blockchain platform, Ethereum.

The automated DAO structure was intended to give DAO participants direct real-time control over contributed funds. Everyone could become a participant by purchasing DAO tokens during a crowdfunding campaign in May 2016. The DAO raised more than $168 million from approximately 10,000 investors. Like shares in a traditional listed corporation, DAO tokens were designed to be fully transferable and tradable on

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121. See, e.g., Zolfagharifard, supra note 114.
122. See Kaal, supra note 74.
125. See ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org/beginners/ (last visited May 5, 2017); Finley, supra note 124.
“peer-to-peer” exchanges. A series of smart contracts granted token holders voting rights. In this respect, the blockchain-based smart contract mimicked the role of articles of incorporation or bylaws. Since the code of the DAO was open source, the token holders would vote on any change made to the code.

The initial DAO did not end well, but DAO enthusiasts and coders are developing new structures to address the flaws of the existing DAO infrastructure. Fundamental flaws in the DAO code made it possible for hackers to transfer one third of the total contributed funds to a subsidiary account. This, and other technological limitations, meant the end of the initiative, but it does not mean the end of this vision for DAOs. Future DAOs will operate non-profits and charities. The possibility to make donations and provide aid without the interference of bureaucratic authorities and institutions sets the

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128. Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to Automate Governance (on file with author); Metz, supra note 126; Michael del Castillo, The DAO Crisis: Or How Vigilantism and Blockchain Democracy Became the Best Hope for Burned Investors, CoinDesk (July 14, 2016, 18:56 BST), http://www.coindesk.com/author-dao-original-code-minimize-regulatory-backlash/.


130. In January 2017, Christoph Jentzsch, a founder of the first DAO, compared the development of DAOs with the development of planes able to transport humans. Like building airplanes for human flight, the desire to build flat, unmediated, decentralized, and fully democratized companies will not be stopped by setbacks. Christoph Jentzsch, The Company Which Consists Only of Computer Code, YouTube (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJrPW3254wg.

stage for further corporate governance developments in a blockchain platform (see Figure 6).

**FIGURE 6: THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE**

VI. OUTLOOK

Contemporary corporate governance reforms are unlikely to work as intended by policymakers and regulators. While a general consensus among corporate governance experts suggests that improvements in corporate governance are necessary, widespread disagreement exists as to what good corporate governance entails or how it might be achieved. Contemporary corporate governance frameworks developed in the 2000s had little or no impact on the performance of listed companies during the last financial crisis. Moreover, the number, scale, and effects of corporate scandals and economic failures do not appear to be diminishing. Additional recent corporate governance reforms generally recognize the shortcomings in the current debate and put greater emphasis on long-term value creation. Yet, current reforms largely ignore the trend from a centralized to a decentralized, unmediated, and interconnected world. Regulators should nudge both companies and their stakeholders into recognizing the benefits—both strategic and financial—of adopting an unmediated and technology-based approach to corporate governance. Horizon-
tal, open, and autonomous networks are replacing corporate hierarchies. This process has been initiated and further accelerated by rapid technological change enabled by social media, blockchain-based smart contracts, DAOs, and artificial intelligence. Given these changes, companies must embrace unmediated and technology-driven governance practices in order to be successful tomorrow. Today’s successful companies embrace these insights and therefore have a competitive advantage in attracting talent, raising capital, finding suitable partners, and perhaps most importantly, in remaining relevant in hyper-competitive global markets.